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ABS'I'RACI' 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the impact 
that Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) has upon Army missile system 
development. It focuses on: (1) regulatory guidance on the use of LRIP in 
the acquisition process, (2) the reasons programs include LRIP in their 
acquisition strategy, and (3) the rationale used to dete~ne the number 
of systems to produce in LRIP. An in-depth analysis of how four current 
Army tactical missile programs have incorporated LRIP into their 
acquisition strategies is provided. The reRUlting., lessons learned by 
these program offices is also provided. The thesis concludes that LRIP is 
essential to the successful transition frcm development to full- rate 
production. The current guidelines regarding the use of LRIP are vague, 
particularly those involved 'in quantity decisions. This ambiguity, 
however, provides the PM with flexib~lity to tailor his acquisition 
strategy. The thesis recCIIIIDeJlds that DOD promote greater contractor 
involvement in LRIP quantity decisions; consider ways to foster better 
concurrent engineering in development programs; and establish a dedicated 
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I • D1'l'RODUCTIOB 
A. PURPOSB 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of 
the impact that Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) has upon 
Army missile system development. LRIP will be fully defined 
and various methods for its incorporation into a systems 
acquisition process will be identified. It will also examine 
the rationale used to determine the number of systems to 
produce during LRIP. This thesis will provide lessons learned 
from the experiences of several programs which included LRIP 
as part of their acquisition strategy. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Previous acquisition policies have been such that delays 
can occur as a program transitions to a new phase in the 
acquisition cycle. These delays are most pronounced between 
the development activity and the production of the system 
inventory. An examination of some past directives sheds light 
on why such a development/production delay is inherent in our 
systems acquisition cycle. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
David Packard, in a 31 July 1969 memo to the Service 
Secretaries stated: 
There is a general deficiency in the amount of test and 
evaluation before we conmit significant resources to 
production. While it ·is generally a mistake to schedule 
1 
a complete break between development and production, we 
have tended to drift too far in the direction of 
concurrency, and this must be reversed. [Ref. 1] 
A Blue Ribbon Defense Panel reported in July 1970: 
guard against concurrent development and production 
Defer production decision until successful demonstration 
of developmental prototypes. [Ref. 1] 
Finally, a General Accounting Office (GAO) Report in March 
1973, "Cost Growth in Major Weapon Systems," had the following 
recommendations: 
Avoid concurrent development and production • . . . Adhere 
to orderly and sequential design, test, and evaluation, 
and . . . clear separation of development and production. 
[Ref. 1] 
DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD Instruction 5000.2 clearly state 
that the production phase will not be initiated until all 
engineering is reasonably complete and all significant design 
problems have been identified and solved. 
Undertaking production before development is completed 
greatly increases program risk. It may substantially reduce 
the time span from concept to deployment, but it involves a 
commitment of substantial costs which may be wasteful in the 
event of program design modification, cancellation, or 
redirection. The use of low-rate initial production is one 
approach to mitigate this risk. [Ref. 2] 
LRIP is defined as the production of a system in limited 
quantity to provide articles for operational test and 
evaluation, to establish an initial production base, and to 
permit an orderly increase in the production rate sufficient 
2 
to lead to full- rate production upon completion of operational 
testing. [Ref. 3] This approach reduces the 
Government's exposure to large retrofit programs and resulting 
costs while still providing adequate numbers of hard tooled 
production items for final development and operational test. 
It is also used to minimize the risk of committing the 
necessary resources for the production phase by allowing for 
test and tryout of the manufacturing equipment prior to full 
production release. 
The test and evaluation conducted on these systems 
verifies that the production process provides material that 
meets the required technical and operational performance 
requirements of the system. When the decision authority feels 
that the system will not perform to expectation, he will 
direct that it not proceed beyond LRIP and further testing 
ensues. 
The Department of Defense has entered an unprecedented 
period of budget and force reductions. The dramatic events 
leading up to the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact, thus 
signalling the end of the Cold War, have been the primary 
impetus for these reductions. These reductions are compelling 
DOD to reassess its procurement policies. [Ref. 12] As we 
progress through this period of change, the number of programs 
entering production will decrease as the sense of urgency 
diminishes. Therefore, there will be more opportunity for 
3 
LRIP. As a result, the process of determining the appropriate 
LRIP quantity for procurement programs requires further study. 
C. OBJBCTIVBS 
The primary objective of this thesis is to analyze the 
impact that LRIP has upon current Army tactical missile 
programs. Therefore, it will focus on three specific areas: 
(1) regulatory guidance on the use of LRIP in the acquisition 
process, (2) the reasons programs include LRIP in their 
acquisition strategy, and (3) the ratio~le used to determine 
the number of systems to produce in LRIP. The thesis 
culminates in a presentation of lessons learned in the use of 
LRIP by selected program offices which have incorporated LRIP 
as a part of their acquisition strategy. Additionally, 
recommendations on how to better plan for LRIP will be 
presented. The lessons learned and recommendations presented 
are not all encompassing, nor exhaustive. 
D. RBSBARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What impact has Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) had 
on Army missile procurement programs. 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What is LRIP and how is it used in the acquisition 
life cycle? 
4 
b. What are the primary reasons that a program enters 
LRIP? 
c. What impact does the defense budget have on 
procurement programs and the use of LRIP? 
d. What rationale is used to determine the proper 
number of systems to produce during LRIP? 
B. SCOPB OP T.BB T.BBSIS 
The focus of this thesis is to examine the process that 
the Army Missile System Program Manager uses to determine how 
LRIP is used in his program. It will examine the reasons that 
a missile program enters LRIP and develop recommendations to 
enhance program success. In order to analyze real LRIP 
issues, the research included an examinati~n of several Army 
Tactical Missile Programs to include: Longbow Helicopter 
Launched Fire and Forget (HELLFIRE) , Army Tactical Missile 
System (ATACMS), Javelin, and MUltiple Launch Rocket System 
(MLRS) . These programs were selected because they all 
incorporated LRIP as a part of their acquisition strategy, and 






analysis includes two separate data collection 
First, a C9mPrehensive literature search was 
to assess existing LRIP guidance. Second, 
5 
telephonic and personal interviews provided insight into 
current practices involving LRIP. Data were acquired from 
relevant sources such as the Program Executive Officer (PBO), 
Tactical Missiles, Tactical Missile System Program Managers 
and selected Government Contractors. Finally, interviews were 
also conducted with professors and other subject matter 
experts at the Naval Postgraduate School concerning the 
acquisition process and production. 
6 
II. LOW-RA'l'B DII'l'IAL PROD'O'C'l'IOJI (LRIP) DJ ACQUISI'l'IO. 
In 1985, following media accounts of waste, fraud, and 
abuse in DOD's purchasing system, the president established 
the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (commonly 
known as the Packard Commission) . The Commission was directed 
to study various DOD management policies and procedures, such 
as the budget process, legislative oversight, and the defense 
acquisition system, and to recommend improvements. In its 
1986 report, [Ref. 4] the Commission made 55 
recommendations to change DOD's management policies and 
procedures, of which 17 were aimed at DOD's acquisition 
organization and procedures. 
The Packard Commission found that DOD's acquisition system 
has historically purchased weapon systems that cost more than 
planned, took 10 to 15 years to develop and deliver, and did 
not perform as expected.[Ref. 5] Additionally, they 
stated that the length of the acquisition cycle is "a central 
problem from which most other acquisition problems stem." 
[Ref. 6] The transition from design to production 
has traditionally been a troublesome area. An LRIP phase was 
seen as a method by which DOD could mitigate risk during this 
transition phase. Through its efforts to streamline the 
acquisition process as outlined in the Packard Commission 
report, DOD published DOD 5000.1, "Defense Acquisition" and 
7 
DODI 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and 
Procedures" . 
A. LRIP QUIDAHCB 
U.S. Government and DOD guidance for transitioning from 
development to LRIP to full-rate production is provided by 
several sources. The following is a brief review of these 
documents. 
1. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5000.1, Defense 
Acquisition 
This Directive, published February 23, 1991, is the 
top level document that, "establishes a disciplined approach 
for acquiring systems and material that satisfy the 
operational user's needs."[Ref. 7] It provides a one 
stop reference source for all applicable documents and 
regulations pertaining to weapon system development. It is 
the primary document in establishing policies and procedures 
for managing acquisition programs. 
2. DOD Instruction SOOO. 2, Defense Acquisition Jfanagement 
Policies and Procedures 
This Instruction, dated February 23, 1993, establishes 
"an integrated framework for translating broadly stated 
mission needs into stable, affordable acquisition programs 
that meet the operational user's needs and can be sustained, 
given projected resource constraints. " [Ref. 21 It also 
requires that program acquisition strategies be event-driven, 
8 
with entry into LRIP and full-rate production based on 
accomplishing specific program results. These program results 
are more commonly referred to as exit criteria. 
3. UDited State• Code, Title 10 
Section 2399 of this statute provides that: 
• a major defense acquisition program may not proceed beyond 
LRIP until Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&B) 
is completed. 
• the DOD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
submits through the Secretary of Defense to Congress that 
test and evaluation were adequate and that the results of 
test and evaluation confirm that the items or components 
tested were effective and suitable for 
combat. [Ref. 8] 
4. DOD 4245.7 -X, 'l'ransi tion fram Developaent to 
Production 
This manual provides assistance in structuring 
technically sound programs, assessing their risk, and 
identifying areas needing corrective action. The assistance 
is provided in a series of descriptive templates. Each 
template discusses an area of risk and then provides methods 
for reducing that risk. The templates are based on lessons 
learned from analysis of programs. [Ref. 9] 
The start and completion of design, test, and 
production activities listed in the table are given in 
relationship to acquisition milestones. The manual states 
that program risk is introduced when a particular activity is 
started late or continues beyond the timeline. The table 
depicted in Figure 1 provides that, for minimized program 
9 
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. 
risk, 28 of the 31 activities identified under design, ·testing 
and production be completed before the LRIP decision. In 
addition to the individual activity templates and activity 
timephasing, the manual provides the following significant 
insights concerning the design, test, and production efforts 
necessary to make a successful transition from development to 
production. 
a. Des1grJ 
Past history has shown that a high risk of failure 
for Government acquisition programs occurs at the outset of 
the design process. While some risk associated with a new 
technical concept may be unavoidable, this risk has been 
magnified by the misunderstanding of the industrial design 
processes necessary to turn a concept into a mature product. 
The templates dealing with design address the many engineering 
disciplines that ensure the ability of parts to endure stress, 
which have been historically underemphasized. 
b. Testing 
As the system design matures, complex testing is 
needed to provide confidence that the system will perform 
satisfactorily in the operational environment. The testing-
related templates are based on test and evaluation experience 
of major DOD programs and the contributions of testing efforts 
toward reducing program risk. Attention is given to topics 
such as integrated test plans, operational test environments, 
11 
reliability development tests, reliability demonstration 
tests, initial operational test and evaluation, and applying 
the process of testing, analyzing failures, and implementing 
fixes. The guidance in the templates addresses significant 
testing concerns requiring management attention to reduce the 
risk of transition from development to production. 
c. Production 
Solving the manufacturing portion of the 
acquisition equation is a major factor in reducing the risk of 
transitioning to production. The history of military 
procurement includes many cases of proven functional designs 
being introduced into the manufacturing process, only to 
complete that process as end products that cannot support 
their mission requirements. The templates provide guidance 
for early and effective planning in areas that have been 
troublesome. Guidance covers subjects such as manufacturing 
plans and processes, quality control, subcontractor control, 
tool planning, special test equipment, computer-aided 
manufacturing, and manufacturing screening. 
5. Jlilitary Standard 1521-B, Tealmical Reviews and Audits 
for Systems, Bquipments, and Computer Software 
The Military Standard identifies requirements for 
technical reviews and audits which occur throughout the 
acquisition process. The specific reviews and audits that 
12 
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normally occur before the LRIP decision and their role in 
providing feedback concerning program risk include: 
a. Cr1tical. Des1gn Review (CDR) 
The Critical Design Review (CDR) is conducted for 
each Configuration Item (CI) of a system when the detail 
design is essentially complete. [Ref. 10] Therefore, 
CDRs are normally conducted during Phase II, Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (BMD). The purpose of the CDR is 
to: 
• Determine that the detail design of the configuration item 
reviewed satisfies the performance and engineering 
specialty requirements of the development specification. 
• Establish the detail design compatibility among the 
configuration item and other items of equipment, 
facilities, computer software, and personnel. 
• Assess configuration item risk areas on technical, cost, 
and schedule basis. 
• Assess the results of the producibility analyses on system 
hardware. 
• Review the preliminary hardware product specifications. 
• Determine, for software items, the acceptability of the 
detailed design, performance, and test characteristics of 
the design solution and the adequacy of the operation and 
support documents. 
b. Test Readi.Dess Review (TRRJ 
The Test Readiness Review (TRR) is conducted for 
each Computer Software Configuration Item (CSCI) to determine 
whether the software test procedures are complete and ensure 
that the contractor is ready for formal software testing. The 
review also includes assessment of the results of informal 
13 
software testing and updates to the operational support 
documents. A successful test readiness review is predicated 
on the contracting agency's determination that the software 
test procedures and informal test results foDm a basis for 
proceeding into formal software testing. 
c. Productio.u Readi.Dess Review (PRRJ 
The Production Readiness Review (PRR) determines 
the status of the specific actions that must be satisfactorily 
accomplished before a production go-ahead decision. The 
review is accomplished incrementally during EMD. Incremental 
reviews are to be conducted at least annually and before the 
Milestone III Production Approval Review. In the earlier 
stages, the review covers gross-lev61 manufacturing concerns 
such as the need for identifying high-risk and low-yield 
manufacturing processes or materials or the requirement for 
manufacturing development effort to satisfy design 
requirements. The reviews become more refined as the design 
matures, dealing with concerns such as production planning, 
facilities allocation, incorporation of producibility-oriented 
changes, identification and fabrication of tools and test 
equipment, and long-lead item acquisition. This review will 




d. JI"UDct:Lcmal Conf1gurat:Loa Audit (YCA) 
The objective of the Functional Configuration Audit 
(FCA) is to verify that the configuration item's actual 
performance complies with its requirements specifications. 
Test data are reviewed to ensure that the computer hardware or 
software performs as required. The functional configuration 
audit should be conducted on the configuration of the item 
that is representative of the production of the operational 
inventory quantities. 
e. Physical Canf1gurat:Loa Audit (PCA) 
The Physical Configuration Audit (PCA) is the 
formal examination of the as-built version of a configuration 
item against its design documentation to establish the product 
baseline. The audit includes detailed assessment of 
engineering drawings, specifications, technical data, and 
tests used in production of hardware items and design 
documentation. 
B. TBB ACQUISITION PROCBSS 
DOD Instruction 5000.2 establishes an integrated framework 
for translating broadly stated mission needs into stable, 
affordable acquisition programs that meet the operational 
user's needs and can be sustained, given projected resource 
constraints. It also establishes a rigorous, event-oriented 
management process for acquiring quality products that 
emphasize effective acquisition planning, improved 
15 
communication with users, and aggressive risk management by 
both Government and industry. The five major milestone 
decision points and five phases of the acquisition process, 
illustrated below, provide a basis for comprehensive 
management and the progressive decision making associated with 
program maturation. 
The key features and characteristics of the acquisition 
process are highlighted in the following paragraphs. Each 
milestone decision point and acquisition phase is described 
separately. 
1. Detendna tion of Mission Needs 
The acquisition process starts with the definition of 
the need for a product or technology. All acquisition 
ACQUISmON MILESTONES & PHASES 
: ;._IIIID : COIICIPI' DIMOIISIIIA11011 hGIIJIIINGa MOOUCnOII Of'IIIA110NS 
1
01" I lll'IIOIIOf 
1 ~ .-----------,!~· 0 ~~·~~· I ...all. ......... -~~Ill 
I : IDCPLOIIA'IIOII& a a : & 




Pigure 2 The Acquisition Process 
16 
programs are based on identified mission needs.[Ref. 2] A 
mission need may be to establish a new operational capability. 
It may also reflect a desire to exploit an opportunity that 
will result in sign~ficantly reduced ownership costs or 
improve the effectiveness of existing material. DOD 
continuously reviews the operational missions assigned to its 
forces to determine areas which are not adequately served by 
available weapons. These functional descriptions thus serve 
as the basis for initiation of a product development. 
2. Milestone 0, Concept Studies Approval 
Milestone 0 marks the initial formal interface between 
the requirenents generation and the acquisition management 
systems. The objectives of Milestone 0 are to: 
• Determine if a documented mission need warrants the 
initiation of study eff~rts of alternative concepts. 
• Identify the minimum set of alternative concepts to be 
studied to satisfy the need. 
Studies of alternative concepts and entry into Phase 
0 may not be approved unless the milestone decision authority 
determines that the mission need: 
• Ie based on a validated projected threat. 
• Cannot be satisfied by a nonmaterial solution. 
• Is sufficiently important to warrant the funding of study 
efforts to explore and define alternative concepts to 
satisfy the need. 
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This milestone ·concludes with Defense Acquisition 
Board (DAB) approval of the MNS and the issuance of the 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) . 
3. Phase 0, Concept Bxploration (C/B) and Definition 
During the C/E phase, results of exploratory 
development, non-government applied research and development 
efforts, and DOD needs are examined to identify and define new 
or improved systems. Competitive, parallel, short term 
studies by the Governmant and/or industry will normally be 
used during this phase. The focus is on defining and 
evaluating the feasibility of alternative concepts and 
providing the basis for ·assessing the relative merits of the 
concepts at the Milestone I, Concept Demonstration Approval, 
decision point. 
A Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) 
is performed to facilitate comparisons of the alternative 
concepts. Trade-offs are made among cost, schedule, and 
performance as a result of this analysis. The most promising 
system concepts will be defined in terms of initial objectives 
for cost, 
strategy. 
schedule, performance and overall acquisition 
The acquisition strategy should provide for the 
validation of the technologies and processes required to 
achieve critical characteristics and meet operational 
constraints. It should also address the need and rationale 
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for concurrency and for prototyping considering the results of 
technology development and demonstration. 
Systems Engineering Management Plans (SBMPs), 
Integrated Logistic Support Plans (ILSPs), Computer Resources 
Life Cycle Management Plans (CRLCMPs), Test and Evaluation 
Master Plans (TEMPs), and other functional plans are normally 
initiated during this phase. 
4. Milestone I, Concept Demonstration Approval 
Milestone decision authorities must assess the 
affordability of a proposed new acquisition program at this 
milestone. Thus, this decision point marks the first direct 
interaction between the planning, programming, and budgeting 
and acquisition management systems. The objectives of 
Milestone I are to determine if the results of Phase 0 warrant 
establishing a new acquisition program, and establish a 
Concept Baseline that embodies the cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives applicable to the effort in Phase I, 
Demonstration and Validation. 
A favorable decision at Milestone I establishes a new 
acquisition program and a Concept Baseline and authorizes 
entry into Phase I. The Program Management Office will be 
established and the Program Manager assigned within 6 months. 
The acquisition decision memorandum issued by the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) reflects the 
decisions made and direction provided by the Deputy Secretary. 
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It also contains additional acquisition direction such as 
program specific exit criteria. 
5. Phase I, Demonstration and Validation (D/V) 
The objectives in the D/V phase are to: 
• demonstrate that the technologies critical to the most 
promising concepts can be incorporated into system designs 
• prove that the critical processes are understood and 
attainable 
• establish a proposed baseline containing refined program 
cost, schedule, and performance objectives applicable to 
the effort in Phase II, Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development 
It is during th.is phase that the principal program 
characteristics are validated. There is a reliance on 
hardware/software development and evaluation rather than paper 
studies. This provides a better definition of program 
characteristics, higher confidence -~garding risks, and 
greater confidence in the ultimate out...;ome. 
The acquisition strategy is then refined to identify 
high risk areas and the risk management approach to be used to 
mitigate the risk. Additionally, LRIP quantities are 
determined. CUrrently, the primary guidance available on 
determining the LRIP quantity is in DOD Instruction 5000.2. 
This document requires that LRIP quantities be limited to the 
minimum required for operational test and evaluation, to 
establish an initial production base, and to permit an orderly 
increase in the production rate sufficient to lead to full-
rate production. This general guidance provides a great deal 
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of latitude to the program office in determining their LRIP 
quantity. The temptation exists to produce quantities greater 
than necessary to meet the above objectives. 
6. JU.lestone II, Developaent Approval 
The objectives of Milestone II are to determine if the 
results of Phase I warrant continuation, and to establish a 
Development Baseline. The milestone decision authorities must 
rigorously assess the affordability of the program. The 
Defense Planning Guidance, long-range modernization and 
investment plans, and internally generated planning documents 
of the DOD components form the basis for making this 
assessment. 
Program risks and risk management plans must also be 
rigorously assessed. This is critical because of the 
significant resource commitment that is associated with this 
decision. Development approval will typically involve a 
commitment to LRIP. The LRIP quantities must be identified by 
the milestone decision authority in consultation with the 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation for acquisition 
category I programs. [Ref. 2] For Naval vessel and military 
satellite programs, Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2400 (c) 
establishes that the following policy and procedures will be 
considered for determining the LRIP quantity: 
• The fabrication complexity of the system 
• The relatively small number to be procured and high unit 
cost 
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• The length of the production period 
• The need to preserve the mobilization production base for 
the system 
• The acquisition strategy that is most advantageous to the 
Government 
DODI 5000.2 reconnends that LRIP quantities for all other 
programs be determined using these same guidelines. 
Once approved, the ADM authorizes the Service to prepare and 
release an RFP for Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
activities. 
7. Phase II, Bllgineerillg and. llaDufacturinsr Develos-ant 
(BMD) 
This phase is where detailed design, fabrication and 
testing of the system is done. This includes all items 
necessary for the system's support, e.g., training equipment, 
maintenance equipment, and operation and maintenance manuals. 
The intended output is a hardware/software system whose 
performance and reliability have been proven experimentally, 
along with the documentation needed to support competitive 
production/procurement. 
Effective risk management is especially critical 
during this phase. To assist in managing risk: 
• Resources should only be conmi.tted during this phase 
commensurate wi.tll the reduction and closure of risk. 
• Configuration control must be established for both design 
and processes. 
• Development and test activities should focus on high risk 
areas, address the operational environment, and be phased 
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to support internal decision-making and the Milestone III 
decision review. 
During this phase, one or more Engineering Development 
Models will be produced and tested. The phase concludes with 
a Development Technical Evaluation (DT&B} and an Operational 
Technical Evaluation (OT&B) . DT&E is controlled by the 
development agent and demonstrates that the performance, 
reliability, survivability, maintainability, and manability 
goals have been met. OT&E is controlled by the user and 
demonstrates that the system can perform as advertised during 
actual operations using user personnel. In most cases, the 
operational testers demand that production representative 
systems be provided for testing. To fulfill this requirement, 
many programs schedule their LRIP phase just prior to the OT&E 
conducted during EMD. ~e systems produced during LRIP are 
then used for operational testing. 
8. ~lestone III, Production Approval 
The objectives of Milestone III are to determine if 
the results of Phase II warrant continuation and to establish 
a Production Baseline containing refined program cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives applicable to the effort 
in Phase III, Production and Deployment. Particular attention 
must be placed on: 
• Assessing DT&E and OT&B results 
• Establishing the most economic production rate that can be 
sustained, given affordability constraints 
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• Identifying the criteria to be used to declare when 
operationa~ capability is attained 
• Ensuring that planning for deployment and support is 
complete and adequate 
• Planning for a possible transition to surge or 
mobilization production rates 
A favorable decision at this point represents a 
commitment to build, deploy, and support the system. The 
milestone decision authority will not approve proceeding 
beyond LRIP until the Director of Operational Test and 
Bvaluati~n prepares and submits a Beyond Low-Rate Initial 
Production Report to the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary 
of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) and congressional 
defense committees. [Ref. 11] 
9. Pbase III, Production and Deployment 
The primary objective of the production phase is to 
establish a stable, efficient production and support base 
capable of producing and delivering an effective, fully 
supported system. System performance, quality, and 
operational readiness rate will be monitored to assess the 
ability of the system to perform as intended and to 
incorporate minor engineering change proposals to meet 
required capabilities. The results of field experience may 
identify the need for major upgrades or modifications that 
require a Milestone IV, Major Modification Approval review. 
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III • PLADDTQ UD PRBPUA'l'IOB POR LRIP 
Planning for LRIP should begin early in the acquisition 
process. As discussed in the previous chapter, DOD 
Instruction 5000.2 requires that proposed LRIP quantities be 
determined during Phase I, Demonstration and Validation. The 
milestone decision authority then sets the LRIP quantity at 
the Milestone II, Development Approval. While no specific 
quantity guidelines exist, current regulations require that 
quantities be limited to the minimum required for operational 
test and evaluation, to establish an initial production base, 
and to permit an orderly increase in the production rate 
sufficient to lead to .full-rate production. The design, 
testing, and production preparation efforts necessary to 
support entry into LRIP are then accomplished as part of Phase 
II, Engineering and Manufacturing Development (BMD) . 
CUrrently, LRIP is part of the BMD phase of the acquisition 
process leading to Milestone III, Production Approval, for the 
start of production and deployment. This chapter will explore 
the planning process behind the LRIP effort. 
A. 'l'RARSI'l'IOH I'RC* DBVBLOPIIID1'1' TO PRODUC'l'IOH 
Undertaking production before development is completed 
greatly increases program risk. It may substantially reduce 
the time span from conc~pt to deployment but it involves a 
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commitment to incurring substantial costs which may be 
wasteful in the event of program design modification, 
cancellation, or redirection. Successful programs are 
generally characterized by a continuity of effort. [Ref. 9] In 
fact, DOD's policy on major weapon system acquisition stresses 
the importance of minimizing the time to develop, produce, and 
deploy major systems. [Ref. 21 By deft use of program 
acquisition strategy and skillful risk management, the spirit 
of current acquisition policies can be accommodated and still 
avoid a significant delay between development and production. 
DOD's policy permits the Services to build concurrency 
into their acquisition programs. DOD has defined concurrency 
in acquisition strategies as the degree of overlap between the 
development and production processes of an acquisition 
program.[Ref. 2] The DOD rationale for high concurrency 
includes providing earlier operational capability when the 
need is time-urgent, avoiding technical obsolescence, and 
attaining efficiencies by maintaining the production process 
and work force.[Ref. 12] One example of concurrency 
is ordering, during the design phase, long lead time 
production materials. This pre-ordering of materials for 
production can prevent months, sometimes years of waiting 
during this transition. Another conservative alternative is 
incorporation of LRIP, whereby design activities continue 
during initial limited-rate production. 
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The effective planning and execution of the LRIP process 
is essential for a smooth transition to economical full-rate 
production of systems that will meet the mission requirements 
of planned system users. Full-rate production of a system 
will not be approved until the product design has been 
stabilized, the manufacturing processes have been proven, and 
production facilities, equipment, capability, and capacity are 
in place (or being put in place) to support the approved 
schedule. [Ref. 21 
B. RBADDJBSS I'OR LRIP 
LRIP is a critical element in the acquisition strategy for 
a weapon system. [Ref. 12] LRIP allows the contractor to start 
the system production line concurrently with on-going 
engineering development. Therefore, the acquisition strategy, 
the implementing acquisition plan, and the acquisition 
management process should ensure that the decision to begin 
LRIP is based upon demonstrated technical and perfonnance 
accomplishments, not schedule or fiscal considerations. In 
their report on LRIP, Project No. 2AE-0026, the Office of the 
Inspector General found that six of the seven reviewed major 
defense acquisition ~~rograms entered LRIP without completing 
prerequisites in design, testing, and preparation for 
production. [Ref. 12] The identified shortfalls included: 
• Significant design -problems, identified in testing or 
technical reviews, were scheduled for resolution after 
entry into LRIP 
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• Documentation from testing or technic~l reviews was not 
planned to be available to support scheduled LRIP 
decisions 
• Essential testing and technical reviews, designed to 
support the LRIP decision, were not performed 
As a result, the Government incurred significant program risk 
from systems entering LRIP when their designs were not stable 
and the readiness of production processes were not verified. 
1. Design Considerations 
It is essential for programs to have a mature, stable 
design prior to entering LRIP. In order to achieve design 
maturity, producibility and testability must be designed into 
the system. The specific design objectives will vary 
depending on the type "lf system and the nature of its 
mission. [Ref. 13] The introduction to DOD 4245. 7-M 
states that: 
Many programs simply cannot succeed in production, despite 
the fact that they've passed the required milestone 
reviews. These programs can't succeed for technical 
reasons, notwithstanding what is perceived as prior 
management success related to DOD acquisition policy. A 
poorly designed product cannot be tested, efficiently 
produced, or deployed. In the test program there will be 
far more failures than should be expected. Manufacturing 
problems will overwhelm production schedules and costs. 
The designation of detailed design requirements in the 
contract is an essential objective of the Government and the 
contractor in communicating the needs of the project. The 
system specification in the definitized contract for full 
scale development is the foundation for the design, test, and 
manufacture of a weapon system. Design requirements include 
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a full and explicit statement of quantitative performance 
requirements. In addit~on to the more obvious requirements 
for system performance levels, this set of parameters includes 
structural static and dynamic requirements, weight, 
reliability, maintainability, and unit production cost. To 
ensure affordability, specified levels of reliability and 
maintainability must be consistent with realistic expectations 
of achievement within the limits of existing 
technology. [Ref. 14] 
The first step in the design process is to review the 
requirements. After that, ideas are formulated on how to meet 
the cited requirements. Here, producibility is considered as 
part of the design criteria to be evaluated for cost-
effectiveness and ease of manufacture versus the degree of 
compliance with the functional requirements. Producibility is 
an engineering function directed toward achieving a design 
which is compatible with the realities of the manufacturing 
capability of a contractor. More specifically, producibility 
is a measure of the relative ease of manufacturing a product. 
How well a contractor incorporates producibility into his 
design, will dictate how well the LRIP phase will go. [Ref. 16] 
A contractor design policy should be established which 
specifically outlines the considerations to be implemented 
during the production design process. Management 
participation in design and producibility reviews is critical 
to its success. 
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As the design process progresses, analytical 
techniques guide the continuing effort to arrive at a mature 
design. While the design process concerns the actual changes 
to the design embodied on drawings and in engineering test 
models, design analysis evaluates the ability of the design to 
meet performance specifications at low risk. Those analyses 
oriented to the reduction of design risk include, stress and 
stress/strength, worst case tolerance, sneak circuit, failure 
modes and effects, and thermal analyses. Inadequate risk-
oriented design analyses probably cause more schedule, cost, 
and performance problems than any other project element. 
Attempting to fix design problems once LRIP has started is 
particularly costly. Therefore, design risk as well as 
performance should be carefully reviewed during design 
reviews. The extra time necessary to complete this evaluation 
will be more than recovered :i:n the test program and the 
trouble free transition from development to LRIP. [Ref. 14] 
The concept of a smooth transition from development 
into production requires that the design be frozen and 
documented at a point in time, and from then on, that the 
"configuration" be carefully controlled and documented. Only 
then can final planning for production, installation, 
maintenance, and logistics be completed. This configuration 
control starts prior to LRIP and must be maintained throughout 
the life cycle of the equipment to avoid degraded operational 
availability and higher support costs. [Ref. 14] 
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Although most defense contracts require formal design 
reviews, the reviews themselves often become a forum for 
providing an overview of the overall hardware design, rather 
than an in-depth technical assessment of design maturity. 
Design reviews must be performed by technically competent 
personnel in order to review design analysis results and 
design maturity, and to assess the technical risk of 
proceeding to the next phase of the development process. 
[Ref. 14] 
2. Test and Bvaluation 
During the development of a weapon system, a large 
number of tests are conducted by subcontractors, the prime 
contractor, and the Government. To assure that these tests 
are properly time phased, that adequate resources are 
available, and that duplicative or redundant testing is 
eliminated, a properly integrated test program is required. 
For DOD weapon system acquisitions, successful accomplishment 
of test and evaluation (T&E) objectives is a key requirement 
for decisions to commit significant additional resources to a 
program, or to move from one acquisition phase to the next. 
To support this, DOD 5000.2-M requires all programs to 
have a Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) • The TEMP is a 
broad, top-level plan detailing all major T&E events, and is 
a primary document used in the OSD weapon system acquisition 





technical characteristics, technical risk, 
issues and concepts, system performance, 
availability, maintainability, logistics 
requirements, and major decision points. The TEMP facilitates 
long range planning and provides confidence in the system's 
readiness to proceed. into the next phase of development, or 
into production and operational service. [Ref. 15] 
a. Deve~opment Test and Bvaluatio.n 
DT&E is conducted by the contractor and the prog·ram 
manager to assist in engineering design and development. DT&E 
emphasizes the use of controlled conditions with the equipment 
operat~d by well trained engineers and other contractor 
personnel , While the goal of DT&E is to verify attainment of 
technical performance specifications and objectives, feedback 
from DT&E provides meaningful input to risk assessment and 
decision making. During EMD, DT&E is used to ensure that 
engineering is reasonably complete and the design is mature. 
Therefore, the results of DT&E are used to support the 
decision to advance to OT&E and LRIP. 
b. Operatio.na.I Test and Bvaluation 
OT&E is conducted by an independent operational 
testing agency to evaluate a system's operational 
effectiveness and suitability. Performance trade-offs between 
engineering designs can be evaluated. OT&E should be 
conducted in an operationally realistic environment. Typical 
32 
operator and support personnel are used to obtain a valid 
estimate of user capability to support and use the system. 
Early Operational Assessments (EOAs) are conducted 
during the C/E phase to assess operational impacts of 
candidate technical approaches and to assist in selecting 
preferred system concepts. EOAs are also conducted during the 
DEMVAL phase to evaluate potential operational effectiveness 
and suitability of candidate systems. They also support the 
MS II decision concerning commitment of funds for long-lead 
items or the use of LRIP. 
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOTE) 
supports the MS III decision and is conducted in a realistic 
tactical environment during EMD to provide a valid operational 
assessment of the system's operational effectiveness and 
suitability. Systems tested must be representative of the 
expected production item. It is for this reason that many 
programs initiate LRIP to provide articles for IOTE. If pre-
production prototypes are used for both development and 
initial operational testing in the EMD phase, they must be 
sufficiently representative of the expected production items 
to provide a valid estimate of operational effectiveness and 
suitability. Often, the prototypes are handmade, then a 
production line manufacturing process changes the operational 
characteristics of the item. This can lead to significant 
rework, additional testing, producibility changes, and may 
cause schedule and cost growth. 
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To reduce these risks, it may be desirable to 
acquire a limited number of LRIP items to complete testing. 
There is still the risk that the additional operational 
testing may reveal deficiencies resulting in significant 
changes to the production line or article; however, these 
problems are mitigated by the ability to correct deficiencies 
prior to fielding. For major defense acquisition programs, a 
certification that the system is ready for full-rate 
production must be submitted by the Director of Operational 
Test and Evaluation to the Secretary of Defense and the 
Congress prior to a decision to proceed beyond LRIP (the 
Beyond LRIP Report). 
3. Production Planning 
Fundamental to DOD production management is the early 
development of a production strategy as part of the program's 
acquisition strategy. DOD Instruction 5000.2 requires that 
production engineering .and producibility efforts start at 
Milestone I and continue through production. Key to achieving 
this objective is the rigorous application of fundamental 
engineering principles and relevant technical disciplines 
during development and production. DOD 4245.7-M outlines an 
approach to accomplish this. This approach: 
• Establishes quantifiable and obtainable manufacturing 
design requirements based on state of the art 
capabilities. As a ~n~, these will include 
requirements for design to cost, quality, production rate, 
and industrial base considerations. 
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• Identifies and evaluates the manufacturing risks in the 
program so that risk abatement for each can be planned and 
executed. 
• Develops effective manufacturing processes and product 
design features which enhance producibility. Efforts 
should target design simplification, design for assembly 
and inspectability, design for piece part producibility, 
and design for system integration and test. 
• Reviews the design's use of strategic or critical 
materials and hazardous material and investigates use of 
alternative materials. · 
• Identifies and optimizes critical product producibility 
features and associated manufacturing processes, such as 
design manufacturing tolerances and process control 
limits. 
• Develops developmental test strategies and plans which 
provide for proofing or validating manufacturing 
processes. 
The term "Producibility Engineering and Planning 
(PEP)," as used in DOD is identical to the term, "production 
planning, n in the academic and industrial worlds. [Ref. 15] 
Initial production uncertainties need to be analyzed and 
contingencies addressed to avoid or minimize program 
disruptions and associated cost overruns as a weapon system 
progresses from development to production. Program Managers, 
interviewed during the course of this study, emphasized the 
importance of a good PEP program. They felt that a contractor 
with a good PEP program was key to the smooth transition from 
development to LRIP. 
The purpose of PEP is to ensure that product designs 
reflect good producibility considerations prior to release for 
n.anufacturing. Specifically, PEP involves the engineering 
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tasks necessary to ensure timely, efficient and economic 
production. It also includes efforts related to development 
of the technical data package, quality assurance procedures, 
and evaluation of special production processes through trade 
studies. PEP will confirm the adequacy of the production 
planning, tool design, manufacturing process, and procedures 
before LR-~ begins. The PEP progress should be tracked by 
means of e Production Readiness Reviews ( PRRs) required 
before production initiation decisions. DOD Instruction 
5000.2 requires that production planning be specifically 
addressed at milestone decision points. [Ref.2] 
4. Critical Decision Points 
DOD has directed the use of event-driven acquisition 
strategies to ensure that program prerequisites are 
accomplished timely and in the appropriate sequence. The 
following are the critical decision points which precede entry 
into LRIP. 
a. lli.~estODe II, Deve~opDeDt Approval 
At the Milestone II decision point, DOD Instruction 
5000.2 requires that the Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation, determine the quantities of LRIP articles required 
for operational testing. Additionally, Change 1 to DODI 
5000.2. dated February 26, 1.993, states that authority to 
proceed with LRIP may require a separate program review and 
milestone decision authority approval at a point specified in 
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the Milestone II decision. DODI 5000.2 does not, however, 
contain specific direction on determining the LRIP quantities 
to be produced and exit criteria for entry into LRIP and 
subsequent LRIP production lots. Specific guidance in 
determining LRIP quantities are only provided for Naval 
vessels and satellites. Other programs may refer to this 
guidance in determining their LRIP quantities. 
b. Long-Lead F1mding Approval 
Obligation of long-lead funding to support entry 
into LRIP is the second critical decision point associated 
with LRIP. The long-lead funding decision represents the 
commitment of funds to initiate production related activities. 
DODI 5000.2 and other acquisition guidance do not, however, 
establish policy for the commitment of long-lead funding for 
LRIP. 
c. LRIP Approval 
The last critical decision associated with LRIP is 
the approval of entry into LRIP. The 1993 change to DODI 
5000.2 suggests, but does not require, a program review and 
milestone decision authority approval of proceeding into LRIP. 
It also suggests that exit criteria be established that, when 
successfully passed, a+low the program office to expand 
activities or commitments during an acquisition phase. Long-
lead procurement funding and LRIP are examples of such 
commitments. 
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IV. UPRBSJDrrATIVB IIISSILB SYSTDIS 
An examination of how previous or existing acquisition 
programs have incorporated LRIP into their acquisition 
strategies may help to clarify its usefulness in weapon system 
development. The following sections present how four current 
Army Tactical Missile programs have done this. These programs 
were selected because they all incorporated LRIP as a part of 
their acquisition strategy, and have either reached, or 
completed the LRIP phase of their program. The chapter 
concludes with lessons learned based upon the experiences of 
these programs. 
A. UK!' TACTICAL IIISSILB SYSTBII (ATACIIS) 
The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is an inertial 
guided missile system designed to attack enemy forces at 
ranges beyond the capability of existing cannon and rockets. 
The semi-ballistic missile is fired from a modified M270 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launcher, and uses an 
inertial system to guide itself accurately over the target 
area, where submunitions are dispensed from the warhead 
sections. The warhead is loaded with M74 bomblets, effective 
against both personnel and equipment. [Ref. 16] See 
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1. Prograa Statua 
The genesis of Army TACMS can be traced to the 
•Assault Breaker• technology demonstration program begun in 
1978 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) . 
Formally started in 1983 as the Joint Tactical Missile System 
(JTACMS), the project combined two earlier studies · the 
Army's corps support weapon system and the Air Force 
conventional standoff weapon into a joint program. 
Following the end of Air Force on·site participation in August 
1984, the Army continued the program and changed the name. 
Competitive Request For Proposals (RFPs) from industry 
for Full-Scale Development (FSD) of the Army TACMS 
Missile/Launch Pod Assembly (M/PLA or M39) and a sole-source 
RFP for integration of the M39 with the MLRS launcher were 
released in June 1985. On October 10, 1985, proposals were 
received from LTV Aerospace and Defense Company and Boeing 
Aerospace Company. LTV's Missiles and Electronics Group, 
formerly called the Vought Corporation, was the winner of the 
competition for development of the M39. In March 1986, 
contracts were awarded to LTV, the developer and producer of 
the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), for both the 
development and integration efforts. The contract covered a 
48 month FSD program to provide design, development, 
fabrication, and test support necessary to obtain an LRIP 
decision. It alRo required the contractor to support the 
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integration of the M39 with the MLRS launcher and ground 
support equipment and to test the ATACMS as a total system. 
The program is currently in its second year of full-rate 
production. 
2 • LRIP PlaDDing 
The acquisition strategy included production options 
to cover all known production requirements on a not-to-exceed 
(NTE) price basis. The basic production option was to be 
utilized unless difficulties occurred in DT/OT that would 
require correction and additional testing. This option 
delineated the producti~n of 66 M39s during LRIP followed by 
a full-rate production of 934 M39s. [Ref. 17] If 
significant difficulties were encountered during DT/OT, an 
alternate production program would allow for an extension of 
the test program. The alternate program included a second 
year of LRIP to resolve problems identified prior to entry 
into full- rate production. This option called for the 
production of 48 M39s during LRIP I, 60 M39s during LRIP II, 
and 892 M39s during full-rate production. 
A number of factors drove the LRIP quantity from the 
PM's perspective. The primary factors were the 15 missiles 
needed for operational testing, while the remaining 51 
missiles were determined necessary to prove-out produr.tion 
processes without incurring undue risk. The ATACMS program 
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{USARBUR) with a First Unit Equipped {PUB) date of September 
1990. The unit designated for first fielding was to receive 
the systems remaining from LRIP I after operational testing. 
This PUB date, however, would later become the primary 
schedule driver. [Ref. 18] 
The program initially progressed using the basic 
production strategy. Just as the program was preparing to 
enter LRIP, however, a subcontractor providing a critical 
component went out of business. The resulting activity 
required to locate and certify a new subcontractor was a 
primary factor in the PM's decision to initiate the alternate 
production strategy 1 whereby a second LRIP phase would be 
added. Due to the last minute change in the production 
schedule though, it was too late to alter the LRIP I quantity 
of 66 M39s. Additionally, the LRIP II phase extended beyond 
the 48 month PSD phase. Thus, the program entered LRIP II in 
January 1991 instead of full-rate production. The LRIP II 
quantity was set at 104 I a significant reduction from the 
original first year full-rate quantity of 276. The primary 
quantity drivers for LRIP II were the difficulties with the 
one sub-contractor and PY90/91 budget reductions. 
The IOTB flight and ground tests were conducted at 
White Sands Missile Range, NM, and Port Bliss, TX, from 5 Mar 
90 to 8 Jun 90. The 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery from 
Port Sill, Oklahoma had been designated as the unit to operate 
ATACMS during IOTB. The soldiers of 6/27 PA Bn were 
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subsequently trained to operate the ATACMS for operational 
testing. Following exposure to operational environments, a 
total of 15 missiles were flight tested demonstrating various 
fire mission requirements. All fifteen missiles flew with no 
in-flight performance malfunctions of any kind. 
[Ref. 18] These Government-conducted tests, using 
LRIP hardware, independently validated the contractor's 
testing and provided final validation of the production line 
and system hardware as being ready for deployment. 
3. ~act of Desert Shield/Desert Stor.m 
ATACMS was originally scheduled for deployment to U.S. 
Army Europe (USAREUR) with a First Unit Equipped (FUE) date of 
September 19 9 0 (see Figure 4) . These plans however, were 
altered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The requirement for 
a direct fire system with the range, accuracy, and destructive 
potential of ATACMS was identified almost ~ediately after 
the initiation of Operation Desert Shield. Consequently, 20 
LRIP M39s, with supporting assemblies, were airlifted on 
August 26, 1990 to support Operation Desert Shield. [Ref. 16] 
These LRIP assets were fielded to the 6/27th FA Bn, 
the same battalion that conducted IOTE. These soldiers were 
highly trained and experienced, proving vital to the success 
of this emergency fielding. If the South West Asia (SWA) 
deployment had occurred subsequent to the September 1990 FOE 
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soldiers with significantly less training. 
On 21 November 1990, Army Central Command (ARCENT) 
increased the quantity of missiles required to 108. In 
January 1991, the Vice Chief of Staff requested expedited 
delivery of all available assets. Through the combined 
efforts of the Army TACMS Project Office, the contracting 
officer, and the contractor (LTV), LRIP phases I & II were 
accelerated to increase missile deliveries from 66 to 86 
before the end of the calendar year. By the end of the war, 
105 missiles were in SMA. The impact of Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm on LRIP is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. 
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The result of this acceleration was an increased 
number of Engineering Change Proposals (BCPs), Request for 
Deviations (RFDs), and Request for Waivers (RFWs) . 
Configuration Control was found to be lacking, resulting in 
changes being accomplished on a missile by missile basis. 
With very limited time available for the Government to review 
and evaluate BCPs/RFDs/RFWs, the program manager co-located 
contractor and Government teams at the production facility to 
accept and ship the missiles directly to SWA. The PM feels 
that the 30+ successful firings of ATACMS in SWA was testimony 
to the quality of work by the personnel on the floor at 
contractor and vendor facilities. [Ref. 19] 
4. Summary 
The ATACMS PM incorporated LRIP as a part of the 
initial acquisition strategy. Although a number of factors 
drove the ultimate LRIP quantity, the primary drivers were 
operational testing requirements and available budget. The 
unique circurnstances surrounding the use of ATACMS in 
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm had a significant impact 
upon the LRIP phase. The resulting acceleration in the LRIP 
production rate magnified a weakness in the area of 
configuration management. 
B. LONGBOW BBLICOPTBR LAmtCBBD I'IRB AND I'OR.GBT (HBLLI'IRB) 
The Longbow HELLFIRE missile system is employed by the AH-
64 Apache helicopter. HELLFIRE is an acronym for Helicopter 
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Launched Fire and Forget Missile. Through considerable use, 
the acronym has become the common title of the system. In 
fact, the HELLFIRE system is not presently configured as a 
"fire and forget• weapon. The system utilizes semiactive 
laser or radar guidance against heavily aDmored vehicles at 
longer stand-off ranges. It provides accurate fire on targets 
acquired and designated autonomously by the attack helicopter. 
Targets can also be remotely designated by ground observers, 
other attack helicopters, and aerial scout helicopters. 
1. Program Status 
The current program, Longbow, is the continuing 
improvement of a missile system that originated in 1976-1981 
as the HELLFIRE Modular Missile System. In January 1991, a 54 
month EMD contract was awarded to Martin Marietta for the 
development of the missile system. The integration of the 
system with the AH-64 Apache will be done by McDonnel Douglas 
Helicopter Company. 
2. LRIP Plauning 
There was concern within the program office as to the 
definition of LRIP. The PM's objective in deter.mining the 
quantity to produce during LRIP was "lowest cost, best 
technical". [Ref. 21] They considered the statutory 
definition contained in Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 2400 
which states: 
. . . low-rate initial production with respect to a new 
system is production of the system in the minimum quantity 
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necessary; (1) To provide production-configured or 
representative articles for operational tests ... ; (2) To 
establish an initial production base for the system; and, 
(3) To permit an orderly increase in the production rate 
for tht= system sufficient to lead to full- rate production 
upon successful completion of operational 
testing. [Ref. 201 
The program office felt this definition did not sufficiently 
quantify the amount they were to produce during LRIP. Upon 
conferring with the PBO, they determined that their maximum 
LRIP quantity should not exceed ten percent of the total 
planned production quantity, or one-third of the maximum 
production rate. [Ref. 21] The project office felt 
that an LRIP quantity that exceeded these guidelines would be 
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interpreted as too risky and costly, thus, not acceptable to 
Congress or DOD. As a result, the PM incorporated two LRIP 
phases in which a total of 1,414 missiles would be produced 
out of a total planned production quantity of 13,311. The 
contractor was involved from the standpoint of how and when 
LRIP would be implemented in order to provide for a smooth 
transition into production. Although conversations were 
conducted with the contractor regarding the LRIP quantity, 
budget constraints were the primary deciding factor. 
The HELLFIRE PM structured the program such that a 
clear separation exists between EMD and LRIP. IOTE will be 
used to obtain an LRIP decision (commonly called the MS Ilia 
decision). Therefore, IOTE will be conducted using missiles 
not produced on an LRIP line. The 20 missiles required for 
IOTE will be produced on a pilot production line during EMD. 
This production line is similar to an LRIP line except that 
funding will come from the R&D account rather than from 
production, and the production quantity will be especially 
small. During the first LRIP phase, 364 missiles will be 
produced ov~r a 22 month period. Since IOTE was conducted 
using missiles produced on a different line, the first 24 
missiles produced off the LRIP I line will undergo a First 
Article Test (FAT) . This test is required to verify that the 
production line is producing missiles representative of the 
missiles that were tested during IOTE. Any changes resulting 
from the FAT will be incorporated into the remainder of LRIP 
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I production. The planned production for the second LRIP 
phase is 1,050 missiles over a period of 12 months. In this 
case, LRIP II will allow the contractor to gradually ramp up 
his production rate, and will allow for further production 
proveout. All of the missiles produced during LRIP I & II, 
except those needed for FAT, will be fielded to operational 
units. Following LRIP II, the program will enter full-rate 
production for eight years whereby approximately 1500 missiles 
will be produced each year. 
3. Summary 
The Longbow HELLFIRE program presents a detailed 
account of the process acquisition programs go through as they 
struggle to determine the LRIP quantity. Although an 
exhaustive review of all current guidance was conducted, 
budget constraints were the principal deciding factor. This 
program also illustrates a more conservative use of LRIP, in 
that IOTE will be used to support the decision to start LRIP 
rather than using LRIP to manufacture articles for IOTB. 
C. JAVELIN 
The Army is developing the Javelin to replace the Dragon 
II antitank weapon. The Javelin is intended to be a medium-
range, man-portable anti-armor system for use in rapid 
deployment operations, rough terrain, and air assault 
operations. Its mission is to defeat tanks and other targets 
expected on the modern battlefield. The system consists of a 
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missile and a reusable Command Launch Unit (CLU) for target 
acquisition and surveillance. 
The Javelin is expected to offer more than twice the 
Dragon II' s maxinrum range (2, 000 versus 950 meters) and 
enhanced lethality. Also, unlike the Dragon, the gunner will 
not guide the Javelin's missile after firing. This will 
enable the gunner to rapidly fire a second missile, or take 
cover. 
The autonomous guidance capability relies on an advanced 
imaging infrared device, referred to as the focal plane array 
sensor, to detect the thermal energy emitted by a target and 
provide tracking information to the guidance system. Before 
firing the missile, the gunner can select either a flat 
trajectory, to attack targets under cover such as bridges, or 
a lofted trajectory, to attack the more vulnerable top of a 
tank. See Figure 7 for an illustration of the Javelin system. 
1. Program Status 
The Javelin program entered the BMD phase in June 
1989. The joint venture team of Texas Instruments and Martin 
Marietta was awarded a $481.0 million, 36-month BMD contract. 
After encountering significant problems in developing the 
missile's focal plane array component, however, the PM and the 
contractor determdned that the 36-month development schedule 
could not be met. In September 1991, the Defense Acquisition 
Executive (DAB) approve< the Army's restructured 54 month 
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development program. The restructured program extended the 
current EMD program by 18 months to December 1993 and delayed 
initial fielding by 26 months to April 1996. It also delayed 
IOTE by 20 months to October 1993. The Javelin PM and DOD 
test officials assessed the restructured schedule as having 
moderate risk because of the limited time available to 
redesign and retest. Production engineers feel that 
configuration management of the system will be especially 
challenging as the program enters LRIP. 
Due to the problems associated with the focal plane 
array, the unit cost o~ this component is increasing. In 
September 1991, the DAE established that the cost of producing 
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this component must average no more than $12, 500 (constant 
1992 dollars) to meet production estimates ~T.d to ensure that 
the Javelin remains cost effective. [Ref. 22] With 
development unit costs currently at $63,000, an ambitious 
decrease of 62 percent is planned before LRIP, with additional 
significant reductions required to attain the overall average 
cost of $12,500. DOD systems and production analysts believe 
that the planned cost reductions may be optimistic. [Ref. 22] 
High unit costs of the Javelin system will likely have an 
adverse effect on the ultimate production quantity. 
Reductions in the Army force structure have led to a 
corresponding reduction in the budget available for weapon 
procurement. The Army, however, has not reduced its planned 
Javelin procurement. Iri response to the reduced budget, the 
Army stretched the full-rate production timeline from 6 years 
(15,000 per year) to 11 years (8,500 per year). Future budget 
reductions are expected to reduce this production rate even 
further. 
2 • LRIP PlaDD:I.Dg 
The Javelin program manager incorporated LRIP as a 
part of the initial program acquisition strategy. This 
program utilizes two LRIP phases during the latter part of 
EMD. The second LRIP phase ~ill start prior to the end of 
LRIP I. This will allow for production continuity while the 
system undergoes follow-on operational testing. 
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[Ref. 23] The total planned production objective is 
58, 000 Javelin missiles and 5, 000 CLUs. During the first LRIP 
phase, 1000 missiles will be produced over a period of 26 
months. This quantity was based on training, testing and 
budgetary considerations. Additionally, missiles from LRIP I 
will constitute the initial fielded systems. During LRIP II, 
2009 missiles will be produced over a period of 30 months. 
Although the PM's theory behind this quantity was to 
allow for a smooth ramp up to full rate production, budget 
constraints are now the primary quantity driver for LRIP II. 
Therefore, the PM anticipates that the contractor's increasing 
unit cost will ultimately drive the LRIP II quantity down to 
approximately 750 missiles. The contractor was involved in 
LRIP discussions only from a timing perspective so that he 
could properly plan for facilitization given the anticipated 
production rate. 
3 • Summary 
Although the Javelin PM carefully incorporated the use 
of LRIP in his initial strategy, subsequent developments are 
having a profound effect on planned accomplishments. Design 
problems with the focal plane array component have not only 
extended the EMD phase by 18 months, but have raised concerns 
with configuration management as the start of LRIP nears. 
Support of the program is also fading as the military 
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downsizes. The resulting budget reduction will most likely 
impact upon the LRIP quantity. 
D. lmLTIPLB LAURCB ROCDT SYS'Iml (JILRS) 
The MLRS is an all weather, indirect fire system 
consisting of a 12 round rocket launcher mounted on a highly 
mobile, tracked vehicle (M270) equipped with a man-rated cab 
and an on-board computerized fire control system. The system 
is designed to supplement cannon weapons available to u.s. 
division and corps commanders for the delivery of a large 
volume of fire power in a very short time against critical, 
time-sensitive targets. The system is used to defeat enemy 
artillery, air defense, other light material, and personnel 
targets at ranges over 30 kilometers. 
1. Program Status 
Although the current program includes a variety of 
system upgrades, the basic system, known as phase I, is the 
only phase of the MLRS program which has transitioned all the 
way to full-rate production. It consists of the launcher with 
the dual-purpose, improved conventional submunition warhead 
(M77 rocket). See Figure 9 for an illustration of the MLRS. 
In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Army, dated 14 
February 1977, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Army to 
proceed with development of the MLRS with the dual-purpose 
submunition warhead. The Secretary of Defense also directed 
the Army to continue to study ways to accelerate production 
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and to give high priority to standardizing the weapon system 
with the systems of key NATO allies. [Ref. 24] The MLRS 
acquisition strategy, therefore, emphasized competition, 
international cooperation, accelerated development, an 
intensive design-to-cost effort, and provisions for system 
growth potential. This strategy was considered responsive to 
the congressional request to deploy the system in five 
years. [Ref. 24] 
Phase I started in September 1977, with Boeing and 
Vought (now LTV) selected as the development contractors. The 
two prime contractors were tasked with system development and 
integration responsibilities which included design, 
fabrication, and testing of the MLRS hardware, and development 
of supporting documentation. As can be seen in figure 10, the 
program entered FSD and LRIP simultaneously, an action no 
longer allowed by statute. The design, development and 
testing programs were tailored to the unique requirements of 
the accelerated project. Testing conducted during DEMVAL had 
to provide assurance that the system would satisfy performance 
requirements after maturation (EMD). Such assurance was 
considered necessary before commitment to LRIP, in parallel 
with EMD. DT II/OT II tests, which normally provide the data 
to support decisions for transition into LRIP, were conducted 
in a combined DT I/OT I. Therefore, the DT I/OT I tests were 
more comprehensive than those normally conducted during 
DEMVAL. Instead of testing on "brassboard n or surrogate 
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hardware which simulates technical and operational 
characteristics, engineering prototype hardware was designed 
and fabricated for DT-I/OT-I testing. These system designs 
represented the production configurations and successfully 
demonstrated the potential of the MLRS to meet the specified 
performance requirements with no major design changes. Minor 
hardware design changes were planned for and implemented early 
in the EMD/LRIP Phase. 
Due to the accelerated schedule, the PM and Deputy PM 
recognized the need for disciplined, yet innovative, 
Configuration Management (CM} procedures. Therefore, in 
December 1976, during concept definition, a person with prior 
CM and engineering experience was assigned as Chief, CM 
Office, to plan and P.xecute a formal CM program. His 
experience with earlier, similar systems helped in the 
preparation of technical documentation required to identify 
hardware and software baselines. These baselines were used as 
approved points of departure for control of future changes to 
the design and performance requirements. 
2. LRIP Planning 
The program used LRIP to facilitate the rapid 
development and urgent need to field a long range, heavy 
bombardment rocket system. The schedule was being driven by 
the IOC date. As a result, the quantities produced during 
LRIP were to help validate the production line, for 
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operational testing, and to meet IOC. The strong 
congressional and DOD support of the program allowed the PM 
considerable freedom in determining the LRIP quantity. His 
decision was to build 34 launchers and 1, 340 rockets for 
testing and initial fielding. Since the R&D and LRIP 
contracts were competitive and awarded concurrently, no 
contact was allowed between the program office and the bidding 
contractors. The contractor was therefore not involved in the 
LRIP planning. [Ref. 25] 
The LRIP phase, as a result of being concurrent with 
the EMD phase, lasted over 4 years (1980-1Sl3). During LRIP, 
the first 10 launchers and 312 rockets produced were used for 
Production Qualification Testing (PQT) and operational testing 
(OT III) conducted from February through September 1982. The 
successful completion of. these tests led to a Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) IIIa decision to enter 
full-rate production in January 1983. The remaining 24 
launchers and 1,028 rockets produced during LRIP were either 
deployed to the first two IOC batteries, or used to support 
training programs. 
3. Summary 
The MLRS program is unique in this study in that the 
original development program spanned the period between 1977 
and 1983. During that time, existing statutes did not prevent 
consideration of meeting an IOC date in determining LRIP 
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quantities. This, along with an urgent need for the system 
and strong congressional and DOD support, compelled the PM to 
initiate LRIP and EMD concurrently. LRIP was designed to 
validate the production line, provide articles for testing and 
meet the established IOC date. The PM maintained control of 
design changes through aggressive adherence to configuration 
management procedures. 
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V. · LBSSORS LBUBBD 
This chapter presents the principal lessons learned based 
on the review of DOD's acquisition policies and from the study 
of the four Army Tactical Missile programs. 
A. DISCIPLD1BD CONI'IGURATION DHAGBIOD1'1' IS VITAL 
The primary objective of the EMD phase is to validate and 
release a technical data package for full and open competition 
in the production phase. Consequently, prior to the end of 
EMD, a firm production data package is not available. The 
program office must therefore determine what technical 
criteria it will use as a basis for awarding an LRIP contract. 
This is a particularly difficult task which requires most 
programs to "freeze" development in the form of an interim 
production baseline. Control of the resulting design changes 
have proven particularly challenging. 
The two programs that have progressed through LRIP, ATACMS 
and MLRS, provide contrasting results from their experience 
with configuration management. Ar an accelerated project from 
the beginning, the MLRS program office recognized the need for 
disciplined and vigorous adherence to CM procedures. The PM' s 
subsequent assignment of an experienced engineer to be Chief 
of CM was the primary act to address this need. This 
individual's efforts to ·identify and document the functional 
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and physical characteristics of each configuration item, 
control changes to those characteristics, and to report change 
processing and implementation status, was key to the success 
of the program as it transitioned from development to LRIP. 
The ATACMS program office, on the other hand, experienced a 
surge in demand just as the program was progressing through 
its first controlled LRIP phase. The resulting acceleration 
in the LRIP production rate resulted in a situation where 
drastic measures were required, on both the contractor's and 
the PM's part, to maintain control over CM. 
The Javelin program office, although not yet in LRIP, is 
becoming concerned with CM as a result of their difficulties 
with the development of the focal plane array component. The 
concern involves additional funds needed to compensate the 
contractor for the production risk he is assuming. 
[Ref. 25] The contractor may have to change purchase 
orders or scrap material to accommodate any design changes 
during LRIP. It remains to be seen whether their CM will be 
effective in controlling costs as they transition into LRIP. 
The experiences of these few missile programs indicate 
that disciplined CM procedures are required to reinforce 
program stability and control costs during the turbulent 
transition between development and production. Proper 
planning for CM by the program office early in the EMD phase 
will help to prevent surprises during LRIP. 
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B. LRIP QUU'l"I'r!' DR~ 
DOD Instruction 5000.2 requires that LRIP quantities be 
limited to the minimum required for operational test and 
evaluation, to establish an initial production base, and to 
permit an orderly increase in the production rate sufficient 
to lead to full-rate production. This guidance provides a 
great deal of latitude to the program office in determining 
their LRIP quantity. The temptation exists to produce 
quantities greater than necessary to meet the above 
objectives. 
All of the studied program offices struggled to some 
degree in determining their LRIP quantity. This occurred 
because current guidance is simply not explicit enough. 
Compounding this lack of guidance is the lack of involvement 
of the contractor in the quantity decision. .r..s a result, 
program offices had to independently rationalize their chosen 
LRIP quantity. 
Although independent, each program office ended up relying 
primarily on the quantity required for operational test, and 
their projected available budget as the primary quantity 
drivers. In an effort to rationalize their projected, "best" 
LRIP quantity, the HELLFIRE program developed the rule of 
thumb that maximum LRIP was no more than 10 percent of the 
total production quantity and/or one-third of maximum 
production rate. The foundations of this rule lie primarily 
on budgetary concerns. ATACMS quantity drivers were initially 
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IOTB and production prove-out. This planning was later 
superseded by the fielding requirements for Desert 
Shield/Desert Sto~. The Javelin quantity is based primarily 
on training, testing and budgetary considerations. The 
current shrinking procurement budget is having a particularly 
profound effect on the Javelin as the PM now expects his 
original LRIP quantity to be paired by more than half. The 
MLRS program was unique in that previous statutes allowed for 
the consideration of fielding in deter.mining the LRIP 
quantity. This, along with strong congressional and DOD 
support of the program, provided the PM with considerable 
latitude in dete~ining the LRIP quantity. 
Note that, with the exception of the MLRS 2rogram, none of 
the programs mentioned quantities required for initial 
fielding as an LRIP quantity consideration. This is 
appropriate since it is in violation of current statutes to do 
that. However, each program has used, or is planning to use, 
LRIP articles to meet an IOC/FUE date. This date is of such 
importance that, in the case of the ATACMS and Javelin 
programs, meeting the IOC/F ·1ate starts driving the 
schedule. Thus, any difficulties encountered in the 
development or testing programs that cause schedule delays 
quickly .:~chieve crisis proportions. In no case was the 
contractor, the organization with the most information 
concerning producibility, involved in LRIP quantity decisions. 
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Perhaps the most profound idea was put forth by an 
anonymous production engineer who suggested that tt~e LRIP 
quantity should only be that quantity required for operational 
testing. His reasoning was that if operational testers can 
validate that an LRIP produced system meets all testable 
criteria, then by definition, the production line has also 
been validated. 
It is evident that LRIP quantities are primarily driven by 
operational testing requirements and available budget. 
Additionally, although not specifically used as a quantity 
driver, LRIP articles used to support an IOC date ultimately 
have a significant impact upon the LRIP phase. 
C. SOUHD CONCDRRBR'r BRQDIBBRDlG IS CRITICAL 
Concurrent engineering was frequently mentioned as key to 
a successful transition from development to production. 
Program Managers who expressed that they had good concurrent 
engineering had Government contractors who had experienced the 
pain of not doing good concurrent engineering in a previous 
program. 
DOD 4245.7.M was issued in September 1985 to help Program 
Managers better understand the timing of the disciplines of 
design, test, and production. It is essential to incorporate 
production engineering, for example, early in the EMD phase. 
Program Managers must also consider the fact that LRIP 
articles are being produced by production people, not 
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engineers, as is the case in BMD. It is helpful to develop 
methods for production through the use of pilot production 
lines, as the HELLFIRE program is doing, to prove-out 
production processes. Use of production configured tooling, 
test equipment, production documentation, and production 
personnel when building EMD hardware is especially 
helpful. [Ref. 26] 
The ATACMS and Javelin PMs, in particular, felt that sound 
concurrent engineering (between design and production) is the 
key to having a smooth LRIP phase. It's not enough though, 
for Army Program Managers to recognize this. A lack of good 
concurrent engineering by their Government contractors 
resulted in goals for the EMD phase that were too optimistic. 
This led to difficulties in getting the production quantities 
to planned levels in LRIP as they tried to get the "bugs• 
worked out. 
D. LRJ:P GUIDARCB PROVmBS PLUIBILI'l'Y 
The flexibility of current LRIP guidance allows for 
changes due to technical difficulties as well as changes in 
the political fortunes of the programs. For instance, 
although DODI 5000.2 allows a program to enter LRIP to produce 
articles for operational testing, the Javelin and HELLFIRE 
programs elected a more conservative strategy and chose not to 
do this. Additionally, congressional and DOD support of a 
program, and the resulting available budget, produce profound 
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changes to the best planned programs. The MLRS and ATACMS 
programs rode a swell of financial support for their programs 
as they executed their acquisition strategy. Their LRIP 
quantities reflected this support. Conversely, the Javelin 
and HELLFIRE programs instead chose a more conservative 
strategy and elected to produce IOTE articles on a pilot 
production line. They will wait on the results of IOTE to 
support the decision to start LRIP. 
All program office personnel interviewed in the course of 
this thesis felt that the current guidance regarding LRIP is 
good. Most felt that any changes designed to further specify 
the use of LRIP in acquisition programs would hinder their 
ability to tailor the LRIP phase to the specific needs of 
their program. 
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VI. COBCLUSIOIIS ABD llBCC*IIDDATIOIIS 
A. COIICLUSIOIIS 
1. General CoDcluaions 
Undertaking production before development is completed 
greatly increases program risk. The use of LRIP, whereby 
design activities continue during initial production, allows 
programs to transition smoothly from development to production 
without incurring significant delays. The effective planning 
and execution of the LRIP process is essential fo~ a smooth 
transition from the EMD phase to economical full-rate 
production. Planning for LRIP should begin early in the 
acquisition process and should follow current guidelines. 
The current guidelines regarding the use of LRIP are 
vague, particularly those involved in quantity decisions. 
This ambiguity however, provides the PM with the ability to 
tailor his acquisition strategy given the varying technologies 
and political fortunes of the current acquisition environment. 
CUrrently, available budget is having a significant impact on 
LRIP quantity determinations. 
All of the interviewed PMs agree that an Army missile 
development program cannot successfully transition from 
development to full rate production without LRIP. In fact, 
all of the programs presented in this thesis incorporated 
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multiple LRIP phases to mitigate the risks associated with 
this transition from development to production. Multiple LRIP 
phases allow greater freedom in making design changes and 
quantity adjustments. 
2. Specific Conclusions 
• Disciplined Configuration Management (CK) procedures are 
required to enbence prograa stability and control costs 
during LRIP. One of the greatest challenges in planning 
for LRIP involved the development and use of a reasonably 
firm technical baseline to award the LRIP contract. The 
MLRS is an excellent example of a program that, due to 
rigorous adherence to CM procedures, successfully 
navigated the transition from development to production 
with an accelerated schedule. Conversely, the ATACMS 
program had to initiate dramatic measures to maintain 
their production rate as they accelerated their production 
rate to meet SWA requirements. 
• An over camm.itment to production can easily occur if 
proper analysis is not conducted prior to the LRIP 
quantity decision. The quantity guidance delineated in 
DODI 5000.2 provides a great deal of latitude to the 
program office in determining their LRIP quantity. 
Although quantities required for testing are easily 
determined, the quantities required for production prove-
out require careful study. Contractor input, while 
essential, is usually not sought during LRIP quantity 
decisions. As a result, each missile program developed an 
independent rationale for their selected LRIP quantity. 
In every case, quantities produced above those needed for 
testing were limited only by available budget. 
• Political favor weighs heavily on how LRIP is used in a 
program. The political process surrounding acquisition 
programs affects the timing and quantity considerations of 
LRIP. The PM with tenuous DOD or congressional support 
for his program usually elects a more conservative use of 
LRIP than the PM with strong support. The HELLFIRE and 
Javelin programs, for example, placed LRIP after IOTE, 
whereas the strongly supported MLRS and ATACMS initiated 
LRIP to produce articles for IOTE. 
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• Articles nee~ed for testing and available budget are the 
current major quantity drivers. The number of units 
generally used in IOTE is small compared with the total 
units produced under LRIP. The majority of LRIP effort 
falls within the category of units required to establish 
a production base and permit an orderly increase to full-
rate production. Available budget universally established 
the maximum quantity. 
• Use of LR.IP is, and should remain, context dependent. 
LRIP is an activity reserved for the latter part of the 
EMD phase. As such, the LRIP process is an effective way 
in which to validate a production line, produce articles 
for operational testing, and to finalize the technical 
data package prior to the Milestone III, production 
approval, decision. Each program may incorporate one or 
more of these uses as an objective of the LRIP phase. 
Depending on the program's objectives the resulting 
quantity can vary. 
• LR.IP should be viewed as an extension of BMD and as such, 
no consideration should be given to meeting an IOC with 
LR.IP articles. All of the reviewed missile programs have 
met current statutes in their use of LRIP. In every case 
however, LRIP articles were, or will be used to meet an 
IOC date. This date can become the primary schedule 
driver, as it did in the ATACMS program. As such, pursuit 
of the IOC date may sacrifice some objectives of the LRIP 
phase. 
• Disciplined concurrent engineering (between design and 
production) is key to a successful LR.IP phase. DOD 
4245. 7M was issued in September 1985 to help Program 
Managers better understand the timing of the disciplines 
of design, test, and production. Use of production 
configured tooling, test equipment, production 
documentation, and production personnel when building EMD 
hardware is especially helpful. 
B. RBCOMMDDA'l'IONS 
There are several recommendations that can be drawn from 
the previous conclusions. The following are specific 
recommendations that DOD should consider. 
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• DOD should consider establishing a Configuration 
Kallagement (01) position in each major program office. 
Establishment and control of a firm production baseline is 
perhaps the greatest challenge to a PM while transitioning 
from development to production. 
• DOD should encourage greater contractor involvement in 
LRIP quantity decisions. The majority of LRIP articles 
are categorized as the quantity necessary for production 
prove-out. The contractor can provide critical insight in 
determining this quantity and 1 therefore, should have 
greater input. 
• Greater attention should be placed on how program offices 
are deter.mining their production quantity for LRIP. The 
milestone decision authority should require that the 
minimum LRIP quantities be separately identified, 
documented and approved at the Milestone II, Developmental 
Approval, decision point and reaffirmed before entry into 
LRIP during production readiness reviews. LRIP articles 
should not be produced solely to meet an IOC date. 
• DOD should consider ways to pr0111.0te better concurrent 
engineering in development programs. The issuance of DOD 
4245.7M in 1985 is apparently not enough. A contractor's 
prior experience with Government programs appears to be 




LOW-RATB r.RITIAL PRODUCTION QOBSTIORRA%RB 
The following questionnaire was used to gather information 




1. Weapon/System Function or Mission: 
2. What is your definition of LRIP? 
3. Does LRIP have a specific meaning in the context of your 
program? Please explain. 
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4. Why did (will) the program enter LRIP and what were (are) 
the objectives? 
5. Describe the effect of LRIP on the overall program. For 
example, were (will) cost and schedule estimates (be) 
adjusted? Was IOC delayed? 
6. Who (position, not name) was (is) involved in the decision 
to send the program through LRIP and who was the final 
authority? 
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7. How many LRIP systems were (are) being produced? How was 
this determined? What was~ preferred number and why? The 
interest here is on determining the appropriate number of LRIP 
systems required to meet a specific objective (e.g., for 
operational test vs. to establish an initial production base) . 
8. Was the contractor involved in this decision process, and 
if so, how? 
9. Would you consider LRIP to be an Acquisition Strategy 
i.e., was the LRIP phas~ planned from the outset? 
10. Do you feel there is increased interest in LRIP as a 
procurement strategy? For what reasons? 
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COST AI1D SCBBDULB 
11. How has LRIP impacted upon the cost of your program? 
12. Indicate the initial and most current schedule estimates 
for the following program milestone dates: 

















TBCBIIOLOGY UD PBRI'ORIIUICB 
14. Was (is) the technology advance sought in the overall 
program evolutionary (relatively small increase in 
technological advance building on the existing state of the 
art as represented by existing systems) or revolutionary 
(major innovative technological advance over current systems) ? 
Evolutionary 
Revolutionary 
15. What were (will be) the most difficult technical 
challenges in the overall program? 
16. Describe the role of LRIP in meeting these challenges. 
17. Did LRIP have a positive or negative effect on your 
program? 
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18. What lessons did you learn from LRIP? 
19. What additional information do you feel would be needed 
to help me fully understand the role of LRIP in your program? 
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